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Abstract
The pre-tracking effects of parental background**
Tracking students in secondary school could increase the effect of parental background 
(PB) on student performance, especially if parents can influence the track choice. 
This influence can be either direct or indirect, and either purposefully or not. Little is 
known about these indirect effects of PB that could arise before tracking has taken 
place. In the Netherlands the track placement decision of individual students is made 
by secondary schools that base their decision on two performance signals that they 
receive from the elementary school of applying students: an elementary school exit 
test score and an elementary school teacher track recommendation. Using longitudinal 
data from the Netherlands, I find that high PB parents are able to increase their child’s 
teacher recommendation (purposefully or not): The odds of having the highest track 
recommendation as compared to the other recommendations, for students whose 
parents have a tertiary education degree are between 1.6 and 3.6 times greater than for 
students whose parents only have a primary education degree. For the math exit test 
score I find no effect, while for reading an effect is found but  not robust. 
JEL classification: I20, I21, I24
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1. Introduction 
To go to the high track in secondary school is often perceived as something positive for all 
students:  The status of the track is higher, teachers and the curriculum in the high track are 
better, there are more post-secondary schooling options after successful completion of the 
high track, and later outcomes (educational attainment, wages, unemployment chances) might 
also be positively influenced by attendance of the high track. It is therefore no surprise that 
most parents want their child to attend the high track. In the Netherlands the track placement 
decision of individual students is made by the secondary school based on two performance 
measures: an elementary school exit test score and an elementary school teacher track 
recommendation. Parents therefore have no formal route to influence the track decision. 
However, parents will still have an influence on track placement either direct or indirect, and 
either purposefully or not. Parents that want to exert influence on the track decision might 
search for new areas in which they can exert influence when they do not have direct 
influence. When a high elementary school exit test score gives students access to the high 
track, parents will exert effort to ensure a good test score for their children, either by studying 
with their child for the test or by providing financial means to help the child study. And when 
the recommendation of the elementary school teacher is important, parents might try to 
persuade the teacher to give the highest recommendation.  
 
When all parents care equally about the track placement of their child and have the same 
amount of influence, no effect of this parental involvement can be found. However, it is 
likely that specific groups of parents, especially higher educated parents, have a better 
understanding of the importance of the elementary school exit test and the teacher 
recommendation and might thus exert more effort, and they might also be better able to exert 
influence on the track decision. It might also be that specific parents have a greater influence 
than others because their characteristics (unconsciously) influence teachers who provide 
different recommendation for students with the same performance. Whether there is a 
differential effect on the two track determinants due to parental education is the empirical 
question this paper answers.
1
  
 
                                                          
1. What the exact drivers are of this effect are not examined here but could range from studying together with the child, 
to paying for tutoring, to making sure the child goes to bed early on the nights before the test. All of these channels are 
most probably more affordable and require less effort for higher educated parents than for lower educated parents. 
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The aim of this paper is to examine whether a parental background (PB) effect exists on the 
factors that determine track placement, the two track determinants, above and beyond a PB 
effect on ability in general. A PB effect on ability is a common result, but whether at the 
moment of track placement an additional parental effect exists above this general effect has 
so far not been investigated. I make use of data from elementary school students in the 
Netherlands from before tracking has taken place. The Netherlands has a strict formal 
tracking regime in which students are tracked when they enter secondary school at the age of 
12 (grade 7). The receiving secondary schools decide on the track placement of students and 
they base their decision on an elementary school exit test and the track recommendation of 
the elementary school teacher, which elementary schools are required to deliver them by law 
(Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1981).
2
 Since schools are free to accept students based on their 
own criteria relating to the two track determinants, parents have no formal route to decide on 
the track choice of their child. In practice, parents can help their child study for the 
elementary school exit test, exert pressure on the elementary school teacher to change the 
track recommendation, and due to free school choice, they can try to find a school which will 
accept their child to the desired track.  
 
To be able to disentangle the general PB effect on ability and the PB effect on the track 
determinants, I control for previous test scores which are assumed to capture the general PB 
effect. Since these previous tests might measure ability with error, an instrumental variable 
approach is used to limit the amount of measurement error in these previous tests. I then look 
at whether there is an additional relation between PB and the elementary school exit test and 
between PB and the elementary school teacher recommendation besides the common relation 
of PB and ability. I find that an additional PB effect does exist: For instance, the odds for 
students whose parents have a tertiary education degree to get the highest teacher 
recommendation are between 1.6 and 3.6 times greater than for students whose parents only 
have a primary education degree. For the reading exit test score, high PB parents are able to 
increase their child’s reading elementary school exit test score with one sixth of a standard 
deviation, but this effect is less robust. I find no effect on the math exit test score. To my 
knowledge this is the first paper that explicitly looks at the additional PB effects that might 
arise in a tracked education system before the track decision has taken place. 
                                                          
2. In the academic year 2014/2015 the use of the elementary school exit test in deciding the track choice is severely 
limited by the government and secondary schools are only allowed to use the elementary school teacher track 
recommendation in their track placement decision. 
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PB, as proxied by parental education, parental income or parental employment status, and its 
effect on student performance is a widely studied phenomenon. The early contributions on 
this field are from Girard and Bastide (1963) and Boudon (1974), sociologists who 
distinguished between primary and secondary PB effects.
3,4
 This paper uses the term general 
PB effect for what is in the sociological literature called the primary PB effect, and additional 
PB effect for the secondary PB effect on track placement. Primary PB effects are the direct 
effects of PB on ability or performance due to nature and nurture. Some of the mechanisms 
are that children from higher PB parents receive better nutrition and health care allowing 
them to reach their potential, these children are also read to more often which stimulates their 
language use and they receive a set of norms and values needed for successful educational 
careers. Secondary PB effects are the indirect effects of PB on performance based on 
different choices at important transition points. That these PB effects are not purely based on 
nature is shown by Black et al. (2005) who use exogenous changes in parental education and 
show that the education of the mother has a positive effect on the child’s educational 
attainment. By controlling for the general PB effect (i.e. primary PB effect) with an early test 
score, this paper only look at the additional PB effect (i.e. secondary effect) on the two track 
determinants. 
 
Tracking has often been found to increase the effect of PB on student performance 
(Ammermueller, 2005; Schuetz et al., 2008).
5
 Part of this increase in the effect of PB could 
be explained by a PB effect on the tracking decision. For a number of countries, studies show 
this positive effect of PB on track choice (See Tieben et al. (2009) for the Netherlands, 
Dustmann (2004) and Schneider and Schneider and Tieben (2011) for Germany, Sullivan et 
al. (2011) for United Kingdom, Ichou and Vallet (2011) for France, Horn (2013) for 
Hungary, and Panichella and Triventi (2014) for Italy). Korthals (2012) shows in a cross-
country comparison that when principals always consider prior performance in accepting the 
student to the school in countries that track, the effect of PB on performance is lower. The 
author argues that tracking is good for equal opportunities if track placement is done based on 
                                                          
3. Jackson (2013b) provides an overview of the primary and secondary PB effects. 
4. Recently Esser (2014) introduced the term tertiary PB effects for the differential effect that PB has on outsiders which 
influence the transition of the child. For instance, teachers might give higher track recommendations to children of 
high PB given their performance than to lower PB children. Teachers might give a high PB child the benefit of the 
doubt since the teacher thinks that (s)he will be better supported by her/his parents or unconsciously have different 
expectations on the children’s ability (e.g. Lavy and Sand, 2015, Barg, 2013, Jussim and Harber, 2005). 
5. However some studies find different results. Walldinger (2006) finds no effect of early tracking on the effect of PB 
once the PB effect in elementary school is taken into account. And also Brunello and Checchi (2007) do not find 
evidence for a reinforcing effect of tracking and they find tracking may even lower the effect of PB on performance 
after secondary school.   
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prior performance, since this lowers the influence parents have on their child’s educational 
path. Dollman (2011) shows that the influence of PB on the track choice is indeed reduced 
when mandatory teacher recommendations play a role in track placement decisions. The 
effect of PB on the transition into a tracked system also runs through other mechanisms, for 
instance through the risk attitudes of the parents (Woelfel and Heineck, 2012) or on 
kindergarten attendance (Landvoigt et al., 2007).  
 
Since a direct influence of parents on the track choice is very limited in the Netherlands, 
parents are left with using indirect influence. One way of indirect influence parents have is to 
help prepare their child for the elementary school exit test. Since the exit test score is one of 
two signals that secondary school use to base the track decision on, a higher elementary 
school exit test score will increase the chances of going to the higher track. To increase the 
test score of their child, parents can help their child study, pay for private tutoring and use 
other ways to help them perform better at the test. Another way to influence the track 
decision is to influence the elementary school teacher recommendation by convincing the 
teacher that a higher track choice is more suited for the child. When both these strategies did 
not lead to high enough signals for the secondary school to accept the child to the higher 
track, parents can try to convince the secondary school otherwise. Barg (2013) shows that 
when parents in France object to the upper secondary track recommendation of their child 
given by the teacher the school staff often reconsiders.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I present some information on the Dutch 
education system. Then I elaborate on the data and the methodology. Subsequently, in 
Sections 4 and 5, the results are presented. Finally, I conclude.  
 
2. The Dutch education system 
The Dutch secondary education system is a highly differentiated system with early selection 
into tracks at age 12 with four main tracks available to students. Figure 1 shows the complete 
education system of the Netherlands. The move of students into the tracked system coincides 
with the transition from elementary to secondary school which is at age 12. The four tracks 
are practical education (PO), pre-vocational track (VMBO), and two general tracks: the track 
which directly leads to university of applied sciences (pre-college track, HAVO) and the 
5 
 
track that directs leads to university (pre-university track, VWO).
6 
 The pre-vocational track 
is further sub divided into 4 tracks VMBO b, VMBO k, VMBO g, VMBO t. VMBO b is the 
most practical track, while VMBO k, VMBO g, VMBO t have an increasing theoretical 
focus. When students first enter secondary school it is possible to enter “bridge classes” in 
which students from (most often) two adjoining tracks are grouped together, for instance 
HAVO-VWO classes or VMBO t-HAVO classes. Table 1 shows the distribution of students 
across track in all grades and it shows that in the seventh grade (first grade in secondary 
school) 80 percent of students are in such a bridge class, but most bridge classes only exist 
for one or two years. In grade 9 only 2 percent is still in a bridge class as can be seen in Table 
1. Table 1 also shows that most students are in VMBO, HAVO and VWO. The practical 
education (PO) track contains less than 1 percent of students across all grades.  
  
                                                          
6. In VWO a further sib division exists for athenaeum and gymnasium. Both sub divisions offer the same type of 
education except that at a gymnasium school students learn Greek and/or Latin. 
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Figure 1: The Dutch education system  
 
Notes. Compulsory education is till the age of 16 if a start qualification is obtained. A start qualification is a 
degree in VWO, HAVO, or MBO level 2 and up. If no start qualification is obtained, education is compulsory 
till the age of 18. Figure created by the author. 
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Table 1. Student distribution across tracks in grade 7-9 (average from 2003-2010) 
Track Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 9 
po  0.27 0.68 0.87 
VMBO b 5.69 6.58 19.06 
VMBO k 3.15 4.44 19.81 
VMBO g 0.40 0.58 9.61 
VMBO t 3.65 10.01 22.45 
Bridge class 80.38 60.24 2.20 
HAVO 1.29 7.84 13.52 
VWO 5.16 9.64 12.48 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Own calculations using DUO data.  
 
As explained in the introduction, the decision on which tracks student go to is solely made by 
the secondary schools. Secondary schools receive two signals on which they base their track 
placement decisions: an elementary school exit test score and a track recommendation of the 
elementary school teacher of the students. Parents can (try to) influence the track decision, 
but do not have direct influence on the track choice for their children.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
To look at the effect of PB that takes place before tracking, I make use of a longitudinal data 
set representative for the Netherlands called COOL
5-18
. COOL
5-18
 started in the academic 
year 2007-2008 and every three years it collects administrative data from a representative 
sample of schools, including test scores from centralized tests in each grade, and survey data 
from the corresponding students, their parents and the schools. My analyses focus primarily 
on grade 6 and look at the additional effect of PB on the two performance signals secondary 
school use to decide on track placement, over and above the effect of PB on ability in 
general. To precisely isolate the additional effect of PB, the general PB effect must be 
completely controlled for. In the analyses this is done by including previous test scores which 
are assumed to capture the child’s ability, coming both from nature and nurture of parents. 
Since tests measure ability with error and thus will also control for the effect of PB with 
error, a second test score is necessary to be able to use one test score as an instrument for the 
other. Therefore in this paper I use two waves of the data: Students are in grade 3 in 2007-
2008 and in grade 6 in 2010-2011. I then use the grade 3 test score as an instrument for the 
grade 6 test score. 
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The data consists of 649 schools in 2007-2008 with a total of 15,473 students in grade 3 and 
552 schools participated in 2010-2011 with 12,538 students in grade 6. Unfortunately in total 
only 62 percent of schools from the first wave participated in the second wave (Driessen et 
al., 2012) which leads to a much smaller sample for the longitudinal data set. I exclude 26 
students for whom the answers in 2007-2008 do not seem to match with the answers in 2010-
2011 on gender or birth year. Furthermore for my analyses it is necessary to have enough test 
score data and to know parental education. Therefore I exclude another 3,811 students for 
whom I miss these vital data. My final sample consists of 2,621 students in 156 schools. The 
attrition and sample selection caused the final sample to deviate to some extent from the 
representative sample: for instance, parents are lower educated, more immigrants are 
included and the school size is smaller (see Appendix A). When weights constructed to 
ensure representativeness for this smaller sample are used, the difference in descriptive 
statistics on observable characteristics between the representative sample and the weighted 
sample used in this paper are minimal, as can be seen in Appendix A, which renders 
confidence in the representativeness of the results. I estimate all the models using weights. 
However, no large qualitative differences arise when not using the weights, which can be 
seen in Appendix B. 
 
As a measure of PB of the children the highest obtained educational degree of both the 
parents is used. The highest obtained educational degree used in this paper is provided by the 
school and is most often taken from the school administration (Driessen et al., 2012). The 
reason a school reported measure is used, instead of a parents reported measure, is that the 
number of missing observations on the school reported data is much smaller. The two 
measures have a correlation of 0.69. For those children for whom parental education was not 
available in grade 6, grade 3 data was used. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics. There are 
four options in parental education: 8.0 percent of parents have at most a primary education 
degree, 20.0 percent at most a lower vocational education degree (similar to VMBO, pre-
vocational education), 41.2 percent have at most a vocational education degree (MBO), and 
30.9 percent of parents have a tertiary education degree (a degree from a university or a 
university of applied sciences). 
 
In this paper the aim is to study whether there is an additional PB effect (i.e. the secondary 
PB effect) on the two track decision signals, over and above the general PB effect on ability 
(i.e. the primary PB effect). To be able to do this I control for this general PB effect since 
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otherwise the PB variable will capture the full PB effect. The PB effect on ability, which has 
arisen during childhood, is a common occurrence in all children around the world. Since 
ability itself is not observed, I will use a test score to approximate it. During the school year 
the students take multiple tests to allow their teachers to follow their progress, also in relation 
to children at other schools. All schools therefore have the same set of tests available to them 
provided by a test company in the Netherlands (CITO). Although schools have access to the 
same set of tests, they have discretion in the timing of testing and they grade the tests 
themselves. However, not all schools take the same set of tests from the available tests. To 
avoid too many missing observations on the test variables, I combine two tests on reading and 
two on mathematics.
7
 For both subjects, the two tests are comparable in content, but the score 
grading distribution is not the same (Driessen et al., 2012). However, the distributions of the 
different tests approach a normal distribution (not shown). Therefore I standardize both tests 
and use either one of the tests. I do this for both reading and mathematics. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variable 
# of 
students 
# of 
schools Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Math exit test score 2,621 156 43.27 10.54 8.00 60.00 
Reading exit test score 2,621 156 75.64 11.50 6.00 100.00 
Math score grade 3 (Z) 2,621 156 0.10 0.95 -4.19 3.67 
Math score grade 6 2,621 156 0.10 0.96 -4.23 3.58 
Reading score grade 3 (Z) 2,466 153 0.11 1.01 -1.93 5.18 
Reading score grade 6 2,551 152 0.13 0.99 -3.82 5.04 
Recommendation 2,520 156 4.87 2.21 1.00 8.00 
Parental education 2,621 156 3.20 0.79 1.00 4.00 
Gender 2,606 156 1.51 0.50 1.00 2.00 
# of students in grade 6 2,621 156 15.20 12.18 1.00 67.00 
Notes. Weighted data. 
 
The two outcome variables, the elementary school exit test score and the elementary school 
teacher recommendation, are as follows: In February of each year (most) students in grade 6 
take an elementary school exit test. The test consists of a part on mathematics, reading and 
world views. The scores on the test range from 500 to 550, while the sub section on math 
ranges from 0 to 60 and reading from 0 to 100.
8
 The elementary school exit test and the test 
                                                          
7. Including a dummy for which test was used does not change the results. 
8. The distribution of the elementary school exit test scores for both reading and mathematics are slightly skewed to the 
right. However, the reading exit test score is truncated for only 1 student and the math elementary exit test for 16 
students. This level of truncation does therefore not necessitate a tobit analysis and thus OLS is used. 
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in grade 6 are taken at approximately the same time with only two months difference.
9
 The 
elementary school teacher track recommendation is a measure with 15 recommendation 
options that teachers used. There are so many recommendation options since all forms of 
bridge classes are possible. For the sake of simplicity I collapsed this set of recommendation 
to eight: PO & VMBO b, VMBO k, VMBO g, VMBO t, VMBO t & HAVO, HAVO, HAVO 
& VWO and VWO. These eight groups are of fairly equal size: 12.7 percent of students 
received a PO & VMBO b recommendation, 12.8 percent a VMBO k recommendation, 7.5 
percent a VMBO g recommendation, 18.1 percent a VMBO t recommendation, 8.8 percent a 
VMBO t & HAVO recommendation, 17.8 percent a HAVO recommendation, 9.0 percent a 
HAVO & VWO recommendation and 13.3 percent a VWO recommendation. The elementary 
school teacher recommendation is given during the spring of grade 6 and theoretically 
contains all the information on the child’s ability level and progress until that point. 
 
Two potential confounding factors play a role. First, since the grade 6 test and the elementary 
school exit test are both taken within a short period of time, part of the additional PB effect 
could run through the grade 6 test score. This means that in the analyses of this paper only the 
additional PB effect of the last two months is analyzed. This can be seen as a lower bound of 
the additional PB effect. Second, an ability measure in the form of a prior test score will only 
capture the PB effect adequately if the test score measures ability without error. Since this is 
unlikely to be the case, I employ an instrumental variable technique to alleviate the 
measurement error in the grade 6 test score. The instrument I use for this is a test score 
obtained in grade 3. To look at the effect of PB I will estimate the following model: 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒6 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒3 + 𝜑3 ∗ 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑢 (1-I) 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒6̂ + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝐵 + 𝜀 
(1-II) 
  
Model (1-I) depicts the first stage in which measurement error is removed from the test score 
in grade 6, while models (1-II) depict the second stage for the elementary exit test. Both 
models are analyzed for the reading and mathematics elementary exit test. Since the test score 
in grade 3 is used to alleviate the measurement error, 𝛽1 will be an unbiased estimate of the 
effect of ability on the elementary exit test. 𝛽2 provides a lower bound for the additional PB 
effect when the parents who help their child study for the elementary exit test in doing so also 
help the child perform on the grade 6 test. It only provides a lower bound since both the 
instrument and the instrumented variable are most likely a function of PB. 
                                                          
9. All tests were taken between January and March. The CITO test is in February. 
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Equation (2) looks at the additional PB effect on the elementary school teacher 
recommendation and the main coefficient of interest is 𝛾3. Due to the discrete and ordinal 
nature of the elementary school teacher track recommendation, for the models with this as 
outcome I use an ordered logit.  
 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒6 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝑃𝐵 + 𝜖 (2) 
 
An underlying assumption of ordered logit is that the slope coefficients are the same across 
categories of the dependent variable, i.e. that the effects of the independent variables are the 
same across the different steps in the dependent variable. To test whether this is the case in 
the models estimated here, I first estimated generalized ordered logit models which relax the 
parallel lines assumption.
10
 However, the parallel line assumption of the ordered logit is only 
violated for the elementary school exit test scores and since this is not the variable of interest 
ordered logit is used. To also control for measurement error in this model, the analyses are 
also done using IV. Since IV requires a continuous dependent variable, I use the 15 options 
categorical track recommendation variable, rescale it using the ordered logit cut off points 
and use this variable for the IV. 
 
4. Results for the elementary school exit test score 
The question asked in this paper is whether there exists an additional PB effect on the track 
determinants (the elementary school exit test score and the elementary school teacher 
recommendation) over and above the general PB effect found on ability. The results for the 
PB effects on the elementary school exit test score for mathematics and reading are shown in 
Table 3. The first and fourth column of each panel shows the full PB effect on the math and 
reading elementary exit test scores. These coefficients contain both the expected PB effect on 
ability and the additional PB effect on the track determinants. Both in reading and in 
mathematics parents have a large influence on the test score, with students whose parents 
have a tertiary education degree scoring one standard deviation higher than students whose 
parents only have a primary education degree. In columns (2) and (5) the test score in grade 6 
is included as a control. Any PB effect that has helped the child over the years to perform 
better in the test subjects should be included in this test score. As a consequence it can be 
seen that the effect of PB is lower in columns (2) and (5) than in columns (1) and (4). For 
                                                          
10. The command gologit2 in Stata, with the autofit option, will only relax the parallel lines constraint for those variables 
where it is violated 
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mathematics the PB effect in column (2) is even insignificant, except for the highest PB 
category. However, any remaining PB effect in mathematics and also in reading could be due 
to measurement error in the test score of grade 6. If this score is measured with error, it is 
possible that some remaining general PB effect will be captured by the PB dummies instead 
of by the grade 6 test score. To remove this measurement error, both columns (3) and (6) 
present results for models in which the grade 6 test score is instrumented by the test score in 
grade 3. The content of both tests is comparable and the F statistic (525.9 for mathematics 
and 382.0 for reading) also shows that the grade 3 is a strong instrument for the grade 6 test.
11
 
Looking at the IV estimates, it can first be seen that an additional PB effect on the elementary 
exit test score exists for reading. The effect of PB is lower when an instrument is used but for 
reading still a significant effect of PB remains, with students whose parents have a tertiary 
degree score one sixth of a standard deviation higher than students whose parents have only a 
primary education degree. The results show that parents have an influence on the reading 
section of the elementary exit test, but not on the mathematics section. This result could 
possibly be due to the fact that it is easier for parents to help their child with reading than 
with math since reading practice in the home is easily available, for instance by reading the 
newspaper together.
12
 However, since the results are most likely an underestimation, an 
additional PB effect for math could still exit although less prominent. Second, measurement 
error does seem to play a large role in columns (2) and (5) since the IV estimates of the effect 
of the grade 6 test score on the elementary exit test score are higher when the instrument is 
used. Interestingly, the additional effect of PB decreases much more for those students with a 
higher PB than for those with a lower PB. The naïve estimates using ordinary least squares 
seem to indicate a much more favorable position for high FB students compared to lower PB 
students than they in reality have. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11. The first stages are not shown, but the results are available from the author upon request. 
12. Controlling for the spoken language at home does not affect the results. 
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Table 3. Parental background effects on the elementary school exit test score 
 
Math exit test score Reading exit test score 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV 
Parent: at most lower vocational 
education 3.12** 0.91 0.44 3.53*** 2.09*** 1.43* 
 
(1.53) (0.80) (0.76) (1.12) (0.75) (0.74) 
Parent: at most vocational education 5.18*** 0.46 -0.53 7.55*** 3.48*** 1.63* 
 
(1.40) (0.75) (0.77) (1.14) (0.92) (0.99) 
Parent: at most tertiary education 10.42*** 1.84** 0.04 12.55*** 5.32*** 2.05** 
 
(1.47) (0.86) (0.91) (1.21) (0.94) (1.00) 
Grade 6 test score  8.89*** 10.76***  7.63*** 11.09*** 
 
 (0.22) (0.35)  (0.35) (0.51) 
Constant 36.45*** 41.29*** 42.31*** 67.13*** 70.88*** 72.58*** 
 
(1.37) (0.75) (0.79) (1.09) (0.80) (0.82) 
 
      
# of students 2,621 2,621 2,621 2,398 2,398 2,398 
# of schools 156 156 156 149 149 149 
R-squared 0.09 0.68 0.66 0.10 0.51 0.43 
F excluded Z   525.9   382.0 
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cluster on grade 6 schools, weighted models. 
Estimates in columns (3) and (6) are from a two stage least square model with as excluded instrument for the test score in grade 6 the 
test score in grade 3.  
 
That the additional PB effect in columns (3) and (6) is lower than in column (1) and (4) does 
not mean there is no or less of a PB effect. Due to the inclusion of the grade 6 test score, all 
direct PB effects are captured in this variable. PB therefore most surely has an effect on the 
elementary exit test. What columns (3) and (6) show is that for mathematics there seems to be 
no additional PB effect on the elementary school exit test, while there is an additional effect 
on the reading exit test.  
 
There are three potential issues that could undermine the results on the reading test score. 
First, using school fixed effects leads to less robust results for reading. School fixed effects 
could be important to check whether school specific factors matter for the additional PB 
effect. One example of a confounding school factor could be specific grading practices since 
the grading of the tests, except for the exit test, are done by the teachers themselves. 
However, by including school fixed effects, part of the effect of PB is removed since the 
parents choose the elementary school for their child. Including school fixed effects might 
therefore lead to a further underestimation of the effect of PB on the elementary exit test 
score. When the models of columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) of Table 3 are estimated with school 
fixed effects the results are robust, although smaller in size. But when instrumental variables 
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are used, similar to columns (3) and (6)), there is no longer an additional PB effect on 
reading. This indicates that it might be school differences which drive the PB effects. Both 
coefficients drop and the standard errors increase, the last being an indication that the fixed 
effects models are very demanding on the data. Two reasons why these fixed effects models 
might show an underestimation are, first, that the amount of variation in parental education is 
lower within schools than across schools and, second, parents choose the elementary school 
for their children which means that including school fixed effects lowers the effect of PB. On 
the other hand, if the school fixed effects lower the additional PB effect it could also mean 
that the grade 6 test score does not fully capture the general PB effect, which is then picked 
up by the PB dummies in Table 3, but no longer when school fixed effects are included. This 
suggests that the aim of this paper, to disentangle the general from the additional PB effect, is 
hard to accomplish. All in all, the school fixed effect models render less confidence in the 
results on the reading test scores.  
 
The second potential issue for the results on the reading test scores could be the sample 
selection procedure. To see whether the sample selection procedure influenced the results, I 
also use the full sample (5,643 observations for reading and 5,858 for math) and impute the 
grade 3 test scores using mean imputation of the lowest stratum. The reading PB effects are 
still there in the OLS models, but disappear when using IV. There is now also a negative PB 
effect for the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 PB group on math. The negative math results can be explained by 
divergent schools which were added to the sample in the second wave, for the reading results 
this does not seem to be the case.
13
 Similarly to the school fixed effect models, these 
robustness checks reduce the confidence in the positive PB effects on the reading test score, 
allowing for the alternative conclusion that there is no additional PB effect on the elementary 
school exit test. 
 
Third, the content of the reading test in grade 6 is different from the content in the elementary 
school exit test. A large portion of the test coincides, but the exit test contains spelling and 
grammar while test grade 6 does not. This leaves room for an alternative conclusion that the 
remaining PB effect I find on the reading elementary school exit test score is due to a general 
PB effect on the spelling and grammar ability of students. 
 
                                                          
13. This statement is based on the significance of imputation dummies and imputation dummy and imputed variable 
interactions. 
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5. Results for the track recommendation 
Table 4 shows the results looking at the additional PB effect on the elementary school teacher 
track recommendation. Also here column (1) gives the estimates of the full PB effect, 
displayed in odds ratios. The elementary school teacher recommendation is a categorical 
variable with eight options: PO & VMBO b, VMBO k, VMBO g, VMBO t, VMBO t & 
HAVO, HAVO, HAVO & VWO and VWO. The estimates in column (1) of Table 4 state that 
for students whose parents have a tertiary education degree the odds of having the highest 
track recommendation as compared to the other recommendations are almost 13.5 times 
greater than for students whose parents only have a primary education degree. This large PB 
effect can also be seen in the blue solid lines of Figure 2, which shows the predicted 
probabilities to obtain the eight track recommendations given PB. Students with parents with 
at most a primary education degree have a predicted probability of 30 percent of obtaining 
the lowest track recommendation, while students with the highest PB have only have a 
predicted probability of around three percent. In column (2) of Table 4 also the grade 6 test 
scores are included to separate the general PB effect from the additional PB effect, and 
column (3) also includes the elementary school exit test scores on math and reading. Column 
(3) shows that for the second highest and highest PB group there remains an additional PB 
effect on the elementary school teacher recommendation after inclusion of test scores. Figure 
2 also shows this decline in influence of PB separately for each track recommendations.
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The red dashed lines in Figure 2 shows that the predicted probabilities of obtaining one of the 
eight track recommendation when controlled for ability still differs across PB groups. The 
slope of the red dashed line is less steep than the blue solid line, except for the highest pre-
vocational track (fourth lowest) and the lower general track (third highest). The two higher 
PB groups are less likely to receive a recommendation for the lower tracks and more likely to 
receive a recommendation for the higher tracks as compared to the other groups. Another 
way to interpret these results is by looking at how much tertiary educated parents are able to 
bridge the gap between the lowest and the highest track, which is given in the last row of 
                                                          
14. The line indicating the model controlling for ability is almost always below the line where ability is not controlled for, 
illustrating the fact that including ability measures lowers the effect of parental background. For the VMBO-t, VMBO-
t & HAVO and HAVO track recommendation, this is however not the case. Karlson, Holm and Breen (2012) show 
that when estimating same-sample nested logit models, it is not possible to compare the coefficients of the different 
models since the variance of the underlying latent (and thus estimated) variable differs between different models. To 
correct the estimates for this, the KHB method essentially uses the variance of the underlying variable as estimated in 
the largest model to estimate the coefficients for the lower level nested models resulting in larger effects of the 
coefficients of interest in the smaller model. This correction therefore increases the PB effect in the smaller models and 
makes the decrease due to the inclusion of the grade 6 and the elementary exit test scores even larger. However, the 
additional PB effect in the largest model still remains which is the reason the corrections were not applied to Table 4 or 
in Figure 2. 
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Table 4. In the model with no controls they are able to bridge 56 percent of the distance 
between the lowest and the highest track, while in column (3) they able to bridge 13 percent 
of the distance. When the extended sample is used (5,401 observations) a PB effect exists for 
the second lowest and the highest PB category.
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Table 4. Parental background effects on the elementary school teacher recommendation  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
o. logit o. logit o. logit IV 
Parent: at most lower vocational 
education 2.05*** 1.54 1.28 1.13 
 
(0.47) (0.42) (0.37) (0.14) 
Parent: at most vocational education 4.28*** 2.30*** 1.93** 1.38** 
 
(0.89) (0.65) (0.57) (0.16) 
Parent: at most tertiary education 13.49*** 5.16*** 3.65*** 1.62*** 
 
(3.34) (1.65) (1.20) (0.24) 
Math test score grade 6 
 
5.44*** 2.65*** 1.01 
  
(0.67) (0.43) (0.01) 
Reading test score grade 6 
 
4.45*** 2.22*** 1.02*** 
  
(0.40) (0.25) (0.01) 
Elementary exit test score: math 
  
1.09*** 2.01*** 
   
(0.01) (0.41) 
Elementary exit test score: reading 
  
1.14*** 2.44*** 
   
(0.01) (0.37) 
    
 
# of students 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,307 
# of schools 152 152 152 149 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.04 0.30 0.38 0.69 
Parent: HBO/WO/(cut 7- cut1) 0.56 0.20 0.13 - 
F statistic math test grade 6 - - - 50.66 
F statistic reading test grade 6 - - - 24.24 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ordered logit with weights, constants 
omitted from table. Odds ratios for the first three columns (eform). Third row from the bottom states: Being from 
the highest PB group bridges 13 percent (column 3) of the distance between the highest and the lowest track. 
Calculated using ordered logit coefficients. Pseudo R-squared for the logit models. IV using a continuous version of 
the teacher recommendation based upon the ordered logit cut points. To facilitate comparison between the columns 
the IV coefficients are displayed as exp(b), similar to the ordered logit odds ratios. 
 
The measurement error in the grade 6 test scores cannot be removed by an IV model using 
the current variables, since the elementary school teacher recommendation is a categorical 
variable. An instrumental variable method cannot be performed using a categorical dependent 
variable due to its non-linearity. For illustration purposes, Column 4 of Table 4 still presents 
results from an IV estimation using the full categorical dependent variables with all 15 
                                                          
15. This also hold if the grade 6 test scores are not included, or when the overall elementary exit test score (i.e. not the 
reading and math parts separately) is included. 
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options. Since the steps in the categorical variable might not be equal for each discrete jump 
in the categorical variable I rescale the primary school teacher recommendation using the cut 
points from an ordered logit model looking at the relation between the elementary teacher 
recommendation and parental education. The cut points are used to transform the track 
recommendation in the following way: The value for each recommendation option is the 
average of the two consecutive cut points. The value for the lowest recommendation option is 
the second lowest value minus the difference between the first and second cut point, while the 
value for the highest cut point is the second highest recommendation plus the difference 
between the penultimate and the last cut point. Column 4 of Table 4 presents the estimates for 
this model. To facilitate the comparison between the different columns, the exponent of the 
estimates of the IV model is presented. What can be seen is that, similar to the models on the 
elementary school exit test score, the estimates on PB are lower in the IV model. However, 
both for the highest and the second highest PB category a significant positive effect of PB 
exists. As said before, these results are only for illustrative purposes since IV requires a 
continuous dependent variable.  
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities on the elementary school teacher recommendation per 
parental background at averages 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper I look at whether there exists a parental background (PB) effect on the two track 
determinants in the Netherlands over and above a PB effect on ability. In the tracked 
education system of the Netherlands, secondary schools made the track placement decision 
based on two performance signals: an elementary school exit test score and an elementary 
school teacher recommendation. Parents have no formal route to exert influence on the track 
decision. Naturally there always is a general PB effect on performance since parents directly 
influence the ability of their children.  
 
To investigate whether there is a PB effect on the two track determinants over and above a 
PB effect on ability, I control for observed ability in the form of a test score in grade 6. Since 
this test score measures ability with error, I instrument this with an earlier test score. I find 
that parents are able to increase their child’s reading elementary school exit test score and the 
higher educated parents are, the more effect they have. I find no such effect on the math exit 
test score. The existence of a PB effect on the reading test score and not on the math test 
score can be explained by the easier transmission of reading skills in daily life than math 
skills. The results on the elementary exit test are however not fully convincing: the significant 
effects disappear when I use school fixed effects or an extended sample. On the other hand, 
the results on the elementary exit test score provide a lower bound for the full additional PB 
effect due to the quick succession of the grade 6 test and the exit test, which leaves room for a 
larger effect.  
 
On the elementary school teacher track recommendation I find a robust additional PB effect. 
The odds of having the highest track recommendation as compared to the other 
recommendations, for students whose parents have a tertiary education degree are between 
1.6 and 3.6 times greater than for students whose parents only have a primary education 
degree. 
 
Summarizing, parents seem to have an influence on the elementary school exit test score and 
the teacher track recommendation of their child, over and above a PB effect on the child’s 
ability. Whether this is due to parents purposefully or unconsciously exerting influence or due 
to teachers providing different recommendations based on PB cannot be said based on these 
results.   
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Appendix A- Representative sample  
 
The main sample used in this paper is a subsample from a large representative sample from Dutch secondary school students. Since a large 
number of observations have missing values on crucial variables, the main sample contains only about thirty percent of the original sample. To 
still ensure representativeness, weights are employed in the analyses in this paper. The weights are constructed using the representative sample 
and are based upon the education of the parents, gender, and two school composition variables: the school average of parental education and the 
school immigrant percentage. Table A1 shows some descriptive statistics for the full representative sample, the restricted sample used in this 
paper and the weighted version of the restricted sample. The last column shows the difference in the mean between the two restricted sample and 
the full representative sample.  
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the different samples 
 
Representative sample 
 
Sample Sample (weighted) 
 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Dif in mean with 
rep. sample 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Dif in mean with 
rep. sample 
Parental education 9076 3.17 0.81 2602 2.95 0.91 0.22*** 3.20 0.79 -0.03 
Gender 9293 1.51 0.5 2606 1.5 0.50 0.01 1.51 0.50 0.00 
Month of Birth 9252 6.55 3.42 2588 6.6 3.38 -0.04 6.61 3.40 -0.05 
Birth year 9252 1998.61 0.55 2588 1998.59 0.54 0.02 1998.62 0.53 -0.01 
Immigration status 7887 0.04 0.19 2253 0.07 0.26 -0.03*** 0.03 0.17 0.01* 
School size 9444 15.84 12.31 2621 14.18 10.53 1.66*** 15.2 12.18 0.64** 
School parental 
education 
9271 3.16 0.4 2621 2.92 0.47 0.24*** 3.15 0.40 0.02** 
School immigrant 
percentage 
8978 0.06 0.2 2586 0.12 0.28 -0.05*** 0.06 0.19 0.01 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix B- Results without weights  
 
Table B1 and B2 present the same models as Table 3 and 4 but now not using the weights. 
The results are qualitatively the same as described in the main text. 
 
Table B1. Parental background effects on the elementary school exit test (without 
weights) 
 
Math exit test score Reading exit test score 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parent: at most lower vocational 
education 2.33** 0.25 -0.11 4.11*** 2.16*** 1.41** 
 (0.983) (0.61) (0.60) (0.98) (0.65) (0.68) 
Parent: at most vocational education 4.72*** -0.19 -1.03* 7.87*** 3.42*** 1.70** 
 (0.98) (0.62) (0.62) (0.99) (0.71) (0.75) 
Parent: at most tertiary education 10.25*** 1.19* -0.36 13.25*** 4.75*** 1.47** 
 (1.02) (0.67) (0.69) (1.08) (0.73) (0.74) 
grade 6 test   9.13*** 10.69***  8.26*** 11.45*** 
 
 (0.19) (0.30)  (0.31) (0.43) 
Constant 36.41*** 41.64*** 42.54*** 65.92*** 70.60*** 72.41*** 
 
(0.97) (0.61) (0.63) (1.00) (0.64) (0.66) 
 
      
# of students 2,621 2,621 2,621 2,398 2,398 2,398 
# of schools 156 156 156 149 149 149 
R-squared 0.10 0.70 0.68 0.12 0.54 0.47 
F excluded Z   559.3   819.4 
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cluster on grade 6 schools. 
Estimates in columns (3) and (6) are from a two stage least square model with as excluded instrument for the 
test score in grade 6 the test score in grade 3.  
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Table B2. Parental background effects on the elementary school teacher 
recommendation (without weights) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
o. logit o. logit o. logit IV 
Parent: at most lower vocational education 1.93*** 1.52* 1.29 1.19 
 
(0.31) (0.38) (0.35) (0.14) 
Parent: at most vocational education 3.45*** 1.73** 1.41 1.37*** 
 
(0.58) (0.48) (0.41) (0.17) 
Parent: at most tertiary education 10.87*** 3.64*** 2.57*** 1.47*** 
 
(2.10) (1.10) (0.79) (0.20) 
Math test grade 6  6.29*** 3.14*** 2.56*** 
 
 (0.68) (0.48) (0.51) 
Reading test grade 6  4.51*** 2.30*** 2.33*** 
 
 (0.38) (0.23) (0.34) 
Elementary exit test: math   1.08*** 1.00 
 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Elementary exit test: reading   1.13*** 1.02*** 
 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
 
    
# of students 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,307 
# of schools 152 152 152 149 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.06 0.41 0.49 0.70 
Notes. Robust se in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ordered logit with weights, constants omitted 
from table. Odds ratios for the first three columns (eform). Pseudo R-squared for the logit models. IV using a 
continuous version of the teacher recommendation based upon the ordered logit cut points. For comparison 
reasons are the IV coefficient displayed as exp(b), similar like the ordered logit coefficients. 
 
